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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Relative Value Guides and The Sherman
Antitrust Act
I. INTRODUCTION
The skyrocketing costs of health care services for the American
people constitute a crisis of national importance.' The seriousness
of this crisis is reflected in the attention that antitrust enforcement
agencies of the federal government 2 are giving to the health care
industry. 3 The agencies are responding, at least in part, to the com-
mon perception that these skyrocketing costs result as much from
the restrictive trade practices of the health care industry as from the
growing use of sophisticated technology and inflation.4 Competition
is viewed as an antidote to increasing prices and antitrust laws as
the vehicle by which federal agencies such as the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the antitrust division of the Department of
Justice (Justice) may administer the antidote. 5
One practice of the health care industry, the use of relative
value guides (RVGs), is currently receiving close scrutiny by the
FTC and Justice, both of which characterize RVGs as anticompeti-
tive in purpose and effect.' A RVG is an index of services that
assigns each service a value equal to a number of arbitrary units.'
1. See generally Skyrocketing Health Care Costs: The Role of Blue Shield: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Skyrocket-
ing Costs]; Inflation of Health Care Costs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
2. The two agencies of the federal government principally responsible for antitrust
enforcement are the Federal Trade Commission, acting pursuant to the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976), and the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice, acting pursuant to the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
3. See, e.g., OFFICE OF PUBLIC PLANNING, FTC, HEALTH SERVICES POLICY SESSION BRIEFING
BOOK (1979). See also Kallstrom, Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors: Fee
Schedules and the Sherman Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 645, 691.
4. See, e.g., note I supra. See also Borsody, The Antitrust Laws and the Health
Industry, 12 AKRON L. REV. 417, 417 (1979).
5. See Havighurst, Role of Competition in Cost Containment in FTC, COMPEIMON IN
THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTuRE (Greenberg ed. 1978) (Proceedings of
a Conference Sponsored by the Bureau of Economics) [hereinafter cited as FTC Confer-
ence]; Proger & Wentz, Antitrust Primer, in ANTITRUST IN THE HEALTH CARE FIELD (Proger
ed. 1979). See generally National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
695 (1978): "The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will
not only produce lower prices, but also better goods and services."
6. Proger & Wentz, supra note 5, at 7. See note 12 infra.
7. See generally Blaine, A Relative Value Index for Lawyer's Services, 53 ILL. B.J. 1006
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The user of a RVG can compute the price of a particular service by
multiplying a conversion factor, the value of one unit, with the
number of units assigned to that service. RVGs, first published by
the medical profession in 1956,1 probably affect price formation.
Whether RVGs constitute price fixing, conduct illegal per se under
the antitrust laws, however, remains unclear.
In 197510 Justice initiated the first formal challenge to the legal-
ity under the antitrust laws of a medical association's RVG in
United States v. American Society of Anesthesiologists.,' Anesthe-
siologists is the only action initiated by Justice or the FTC against
RVGs that went to trial.' 2 In the other actions the defendants
signed consent orders prohibiting them from further development
or dissemination of RVGs." Therefore, the decision of the Anes-
thesiologists court, upholding the use of a RVG, threatens to frus-
trate the efforts of the FTC and Justice to prevent physicians'
groups from formulating and using RVGs. After reviewing the appli-
cable case law under the Sherman Act, this Recent Development
focuses on the impact of United States v. American Society of Anes-
thesiologists on the law of antitrust. The Development concludes
with a consideration of the legality of RVGs and the proper role of
RVGs in the fight against increases in the costs of health care.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Basis
The cornerstone of antitrust law in the United States is the
(1965); Brewster & Seldowitz, Medical Society Relative Value Scales and the Medical
Market, 80 PUB. HEALTH REP. 501 (1965).
8. Brewster & Seldowitz, supra note 7, at 502.
9. See United States v. American Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 147,
159 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
10. Not coincidentally, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), was decided
in 1975. See text accompanying notes 53-55 infra.
11. See note 9 supra.
12. See United States v. Alameda County Veterinary Medical Ass'n, 1977-2 Trade Cas.
61,738 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (consent order prohibited use of fee surveys or schedules); United
States v. Illinois Podiatry Soc'y, Inc., 1977-2 Trade Cas. % 61,767 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (consent
decree); California Medical Ass'n, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,403 (April 17, 1979) (con-
sent order); Minnesota State Medical Ass'n, 90 F.T.C. 337 (1977) (consent order); American
College of Radiology, 89 F.T.C. 144 (1977) (consent order); American Academy of Ortho-
pedic Surgeons, 88 F.T.C. 968 (1976) (consent order); American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 88 F.T.C. 955 (1976) (consent order).
13. See note 12 supra. The effect of these actions was to stop medical groups from using
RVGs. See Borsody, supra note 4, at 455. The relative ease with which the FTC obtained the
consent orders may be distinguished from the Anesthesiologists holding on the basis of the
difference in scope between the FTC Act and the Sherman Act. See generally FTC v. Brown
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); FTC v Motion Picture Ad. Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
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Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890."1 Section 1 of the Act provides in
part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 5 The
sweeping language of section 1 presents a problem: since "restraint
is the very essence of every contract; read literally, § 1 would outlaw
the entire body of private contract law.""6 Because of the haphazard
manner in which the Sherman Act passed through Congress, legisla-
tive history, which ordinarily enables a court to react beyond a
statute's literal meaning, 7 provides little help in determining its
intended meaning."8 Senator Sherman's statement that the Act
"does not announce a new principle of law, but applies old and well
recognized principles of the common law,"' 9 has been a source
of confusion in construing an Act designed to balance the struggle
between competition and combination in ways unknown to the
common law.2o
B. The Per Se Rule and the Rule of Reason
The first Supreme Court decision to interpret section 1 of the
Sherman Act was United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
15. Id. § 1.
16. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978)
(footnotes omitted).
17. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940) (Stone, C.J.):
The prohibitions of the Sherman Act were not stated in terms of precision or of crystal
clarity and the Act itself does not define them. In consequence of the vagueness of its
language, perhaps not uncalculated, the courts have been left to give content to the
statute, and in the performance of that function it is appropriate that courts should
interpret its words in the light of its legislative history and the particular evils at which
the legislation was aimed.
18. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897);
THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 214-21,
225-32 (1954). See also LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EvOLUTION OF THE
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 85-99 (1965). For the classic statement on the legislative history of
the Sherman Act, see HAMILTON & TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION 11 (1940): "The great bother is
that the bill which was arduously debated was never passed, and that the bill which was
passed was never really discussed."
19. 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890).
20. See LETWIN, supra note 18, at 97; POSNER, ANTrrRusT LAw, AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 24 (1976):
The discontinuity between the common law of trade regulation and the Sherman
Act is important to remember whenever one sees a lawyer or judge attempting to buttress
his antitrust theories by reference to some common-law doctrine that he contends was
incorporated into the antitrust laws by the Sherman Act. Such an argument is almost
always unhistorical. The Sherman Act did not enact the common law of restraint of




Association.2' The Trans-Missouri Court held that price fixing by
defendant railroads was illegal under section 1 and flatly refused to
consider the defense that the prices fixed were reasonable.2 2 United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 3 recognized that the proper
test of legality under section 1 was the reasonableness of the chal-
lenged practice.2 4 The Court held, however, that when the chal-
lenged practice is price fixing, no analysis of the reasonableness of
the price is necessary. 25 Addyston specifically rejected the defen-
dants' invitation to consider the effect of the price fixing upon the
market, noting that even if price fixing was the only solution to a
chaotic market, it was still illegal under the Sherman Act.26 The
rationale for the per se approach was judicial efficiency, courts not
having the time or the expertise to consider defenses to price fixing,
an activity so obviously inimical to competition.
2
1
Twelve years after first indicating that only unreasonable prac-
tices were prohibited restraints of trade, the Supreme Court, in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States28 spelled out the "standard of
reason"29 applicable under section 1, declaring illegal contracts or
conduct creating "unreasonably restrictive conditions."3 This Rule
of Reason was applied to determine whether the challenged practice
was a restraint of trade. The Rule was not intended to apply to a
determination of whether a practice, found to be a restraint of trade,
was reasonable in light of the condition of the industry and other
factors.
3 '
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States32 broadened the Rule
21. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
22. Id. at 339-42.
23. 175 U.S. 211 (1899), aff'g 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.).
24. Id. at 235-38.
25. Id. at 238, quoting 85 F. at 293.
26. 175 U.S. at 235.
27. For an early explanation of the application of the per se rule to price fixing, see
People v. Sheldon, 139 N.Y. 251, 264, 34 N.E. 785, 789 (1893) (Andrews, C.J.), quoted in
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 288:
If agreements and combinations to prevent competition in prices are or may be
hurtful to trade, the only sure remedy is to prohibit all agreements of that character. If
the validity of such an agreement was made to depend upon actual proof of public
prejudice or injury, it would be very difficult in any case to establish the invalidity,
although the moral evidence might be very convincing.
See also SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 1, at 7 (1977).
28. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
29. Id. at 60.
30. Id. at 58.
31. The Standard Oil Court stated: "[R]esort to reason was not permissible in order
to allow that to be done which the statute prohibited." Id. at 65. Accord National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978).
32. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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of Reason under the precedential aegis of Standard Oil. The test was
not whether the practice of price fixing was unreasonably anticom-
petitive and, therefore, a prohibited restraint, but whether the price
fixing of the Board of Trade,3 3 admittedly a restraint under the Act,
promoted or destroyed competition. Never before had a restraint
been thought capable of "promoting" competition. Furthermore, as
the Court noted, a determination whether a practice promotes or
destroys competition required an examination of the industry in-
volved-the very thing earlier Courts had attempted to preclude by
finding that price fixing was a practice that is always unreasonably
anticompetitive and, therefore, a prohibited restraint. Thus, Board
of Trade represents a shift in focus from that of Standard Oil, the
reasonableness of the practice, to the reasonableness of the re-
straint. 5
United States v. Trenton Potteries" attempted to reestablish
the per se approach of Trans-Missouri and prohibit the use of a
reasonableness standard to validate price fixing.37 Trenton held that
the practice of price fixing was unreasonably anticompetitive. and,
therefore, was a restraint prohibited under the Sherman Act. The
Court distinguished Board of Trade on the basis that a regulated
board of trade required different treatment than that of competitors
in an "open market." 38 Enunciating the per se rule, Trenton noted
that the object of the Act was "maintenance of competition" and
that an effective price fixing agreement was designed to eliminate
competition. 9
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States"° twisted the per se
33. The Chicago Board of Trade had established a rule fixing the price of grain bought
by members of the Board when the Board was closed at the last closing price. See generally
GELHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 173 (1976).
34. The Court stated:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied ....
246 U.S. at 238.
35. This shift in focus is reflected in the Court's statement that:
Every Board of Trade and nearly every trade organization imposes some restraint upon
the conduct of business by its members. Those relating to the hours in which business
may be done are common; and they tend to make a special appeal where, as here, they
tend to shorten the working day or, at least, limit the period of most exacting activity.
Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
36. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
37. GELHORN, supra note 33, at 175. But see Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U.S. 344 (1933).
38. 273 U.S. at 401.
39. Id. at 397.
40. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
1980]
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rule of Trenton by inserting a Rule of Reason analysis into the
factual determination of whether the challenged practice was price
fixing. Appalachian, citing Board of Trade, held that activities that
fix prices are not necessarily the price fixing which triggers the per
se rule.4' The Court held that when 137 competitors, producers of
coal, combined into a joint selling agency to set uniform prices for
the 137 members, no price fixing of the per se type existed. The joint
setting of prices was not illegal price fixing because the joint action
was reasonable in light of the chaotic conditions of the industry and
the national economy.42 Standard Oil had stated the Rule of Reason
test as whether the challenged practice was unreasonably anticom-
petitive and, therefore, a restraint prohibited under the Act. Board
of Trade asked whether the restraint itself was reasonable in light
of the surrounding circumstances and, therefore, permissible.
Appalachian broadened the Rule of Reason to swallow the per se
rule by inquiring whether the particular price fixing was unreason-
able and, as such, the type of price fixing illegal per se under the
Act.4"
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.44 attempted to repair
the damage inflicted by Appalachian and reassert the per se illegal-
ity of practices that fixed prices. Unfortunately, Socony failed to
expressly overrule Board of Trade and Appalachian.4 5 The Court
did, however, overrule sub silentio the Board of Trade and
Appalachian tests of reasonableness" with the statement that
"Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not
particular price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or de-
structive; ' '4 unless the practices challenged in the earlier cases were
not price fixing within the scope of the Socony holding. The breadth
41. Id.
42. Id. at 373.
43. The Appalachian Court stated:
It is therefore necessary in this instance to consider the economic conditions peculiar to
the coal industry, the practices which have obtained, the nature of defendant's plan of
making sales, the reasons which led to its adoption, and the probable consequences of
the carrying out of that plan in relation to market prices and other matters affecting the
public interest in interstate commerce in bituminous coal.
Id. at 361.
44. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
45. Instead, the Socony Court distinguished both cases, id. at 216-17, and flatly stated:
Thus for over forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation adhered
to the principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act
and that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements
were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense.
Id. at 218.
46. See text accompanying notes 32-35, 40-42 supra.
47. 310 U.S. at 221. For a discussion of the "aberrant" cases of Board of Trade and
Appalachian, see SULLIVAN, supra note 27, § 68, at 186 (1977).
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of the Socony holding renders such a conclusion impossible: "under
the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with
the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the
price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per
se."
48
The Socony Court specified that a finding of per se illegality did
not require:
that both a purpose and a power to fix prices are necessary for the establish-
ment of a conspiracy under § 1 of the Sherman Act .... It is the "contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce" which § 1
of the Act strikes down, whether the concerted activity be wholly nascent or
abortive on the one hand, or successful on the other.4'
Furthermore, the "conspirators" need not have "the means avail-
able for accomplishment of their objective . . . ,,0 The Socony
holding was a restatement of the Rule of Reason articulated in
Standard Oil: "Whatever economic justification particular price-
fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit
an inquiry into their reasonableness. They are all banned because
of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of
the economy." 5'
United States v. United Liquors Corp. 52 established that price
fixing, pursuant to the Socony doctrine, included practices other
than the setting of uniform prices in dollar amounts. In United
Liquors an agreement fixing the percentage of discounts and the
classification procedures used in determining which customers
would receive the discounts was held to be price fixing and, thus,
illegal per se, even though there was no agreement on the base prices
from which the discounts were computed.
The 1975 decision of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar53 illustrates
how the Court's use of the per se and Rule of Reason doctrines
results in confusion. In Goldfarb the Court first asked whether res-
pondents had engaged in price fixing. 4 If price fixing is found, the
Court applies the per se rule. This method of analysis encourages
litigants and courts to raise the issue of reasonableness within the
48. 310 U.S. at 223.
49. Id. at 224 n.59.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 149 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Tenn. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 991 (1957). For a
listing of cases in which an agreement for the maintenance of price differentials was held
unlawful, see 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4630.33 (1971).
53. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
54. Id. at 780.
19801
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determination of whether price fixing exists. 5 This approach was
approved in Board of Trade and Appalachian56 but specifically disa-
vowed in Socony.57 Although the Goldfarb Court held that the use
of a minimum fee schedule was price fixing and illegal per se, the
Court still discussed, albeit briefly, the "unusually damaging" na-
ture of the fee schedule on competition and the consumer. " Such a
discussion is unnecessary under the per se rule and only serves to
confuse lower courts in their efforts to delineate the parameters of
the Rule of Reason and the per se rule."
The Court's recent decision in National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States" is another example of the confusion in
this area. The Court quoted Board of Trade's statement of the Rule
of Reason despite the questionable validity of Board of Trade after
Socony.6' The Court did clarify, however, that the Rule of Reason
cannot justify anticompetitive price fixing: "Contrary to its name,
the Rule [of Reason] does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to
any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within
the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged
restraint's impact on competitive conditions.""2
The convoluted development of the rule of per se illegality and
the Rule of Reason permits courts to determine the legality of a
challenged trade practice in an ad hoc, outcome determinative man-
ner.13 Under the rubric of "reasonableness" courts can hold that
price fixing is not the price fixing held to be illegal per se under the
Sherman Act." Such judicial activity renders uncertain the state of
the law and, if Socony was correct in its interpretation of the Sher-
55. See id. at 781-83; note 64 infra. See generally Bauer, Professional Activities and the
Antitrust Laws, 50 NOTRE DAME LAw. 570, 571 (1975).
56. See text accompanying notes 32-35, 40-43 supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 44-51 supra.
58. 421 U.S. at 782-83.
59. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 1979-1 Trade Cas. 62,694,
at 77,893 (D. Ariz. 1979). The Maricopa court held that: "[Tihe Rule of Reason is to be
applied when analyzing practices of professions alleged to be in violation of the antitrust
laws." Id. at 77,897.
60. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
61. The Professional Engineers Court stated: "the inquiry mandated by the Rule of
Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that
suppresses competition." Id. at 691.
62. Id. at 688.
63. See note 9, supra.
64. The analysis often used to achieve this result is illustrated in Maricopa Medical
Society, in which the court found that the physicians "have agreed in advance to accept in
full satisfaction the amount determined," but then proceeded to consider reasonableness after
noting the absence of evidence "that the physicians individually agreed to those terms [the
price fixing] which presumably would preclude finding any antitrust violation even under a
per se analysis." 1979-1 Trade Cas. 62,694, at 77,895 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 33:233
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man Act as establishing the per se illegality of price fixing, usurps
the role of the legislature in determining the antitrust policy of the
United States."
C. The Learned Professions Exemption
Until Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar6 it was commonly thought
that the "learned professions," such as the practice of medicine,
were exempt from the reach of the Sherman Act.67 The exemption
was based on the principle that the activities of a profession were
not "trade or commerce.""8 The principle originated with the case
of The Schooner Nymph" in which the court distinguished the
"learned professions" from groups engaged in "trade." 0 Goldfarb
held that "[t]he nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not
provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act, nor is the public-service
aspect of professional practice controlling in determining whether §
1 includes professionals." 7' The Court left uncertain, however, the
extent to which the professions were subject either to the Sherman
Act or the judicial doctrines that the Court had developed in apply-
ing the Act.72 Goldfarb suggested that the per se rules might not
apply to the professions because even anticompetitive practices of
the professions might be justified under a rule of reason, given their
special relationship to the public.
73
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States
74
established that professions were subject to rules of per se illegal-
ity.75 Not only did the Court in dicta reassert the Socony holding
65. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
66. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
67. See, e.g., Note, Application of the Antitrust Laws to Anticompetitive Activities by
Physicians, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 991 (1977). See generally Annot., 39 A.L.R. FED. 774 (1978).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952);
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 436 (1932).
69. 18 F. Cas. 506 (C.C.D. Me. 1834).
70. Id. at 507.
71. 421 U.S. at 787 (citation omitted).
72. The Court stated:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is,
of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman
Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with
other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust con-
cepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of
the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate no
view on any other situation than the one with which we are contronted today.
Id. at 788 n.17.
73. Id.
74. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
75. Id. at 696.
1980]
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that price fixing was illegal per se and applicable to the professions,
but the Professional Engineers Court held that the ban on competi-
tive bidding challenged in the case, although not price fixing, was
also illegal per se.76 Whatever the impact of professional involve-
ment on a challenge to a trade practice, Professional Engineers
indicates that price fixing by professionals is subject to the per se
rule and cannot be justified with arguments as to the reasonableness
of price fixing in the carrying out of professional responsibilities to
the public 
7
III. UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS
On September 22, 1975, Justice filed suit for injunctive relief
against the American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) pursuant
to sections 1 and 4 of the Sherman Act. 78 The Complaint alleged
that the ASA's RVG, first adopted in 1962,11 was price fixing, illegal
per se.8 ° The ASA answered that its RVG was not price fixing be-
cause the RVG was only advisory and was a reasonable effort to
establish a rational system of pricing for the services of anesthesiolo-
gists.8 ' Furthermore, the ASA claimed that even if the RVG was
76. Id. at 692. The reassertion of the per se illegality of price fixing was dicta because
of the Court's statement that the bidding was not price fixing. The Court's analysis of the
bidding in terms of its effects on prices, however, along with the Goldfarb holding, leaves little
doubt that professionals' price fixing is subject to the traditional Socony doctrine of per se
illegality.
77. Id. at 696.
78. The ASA is a tax exempt membership corporation incorporated in New York State
with an office in Park Ridge, Illinois. The ASA has approximately 11,000 members, including
nearly all of the anesthesiologists in the United States. Nurse anesthetists, however, are not
members of the ASA. In a cryptic footnote the Anesthesiologists court noted both that nurse
anesthetists "engage in a fee for service practice" and that "there is no evidence to support
the conclusion that [nurse anesthetists] compete with anesthesiologists." 473 F. Supp. at
160 n.22. Whether or not anesthesiologists and anesthetists compete, anesthetists admin-
ister almost half of all anesthesia in the United States. Medicare-Medicaid Administrative
and Reimbursement Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 365 (1977) (Statement of Ms. Ecklund, President
of the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
Reform Act]. There is a current feud between the two professional groups as to the
qualifications and capabilities of the certified nurse anesthetist. Compare id. at 394-98
(Statement of Ms. Ecklund) with id. at 373-84 (Statement of Dr. Ament, President of the
ASA).
79. On October 25, 1962, the ASA adopted a RVG on the nearly unanimous vote of the
ASA's House of Delegates. Between 1962 and 1974 five editions of the ASA's RVG were
adopted and distributed to the membership and insurers, including state and federal agen-
cies.
80. 473 F. Supp. at 155.
81. The ASA did not adopt a conversion factor and never suggested actual dollar values
for the RVG's units. Component societies of the ASA, however, often set conversion factors.
Id. at 154-55. The "advisory" nature of the ASA's RVGs may be the basis for the Anes-
thesiologist's court's holding. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781 (1975),
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price fixing, the Sherman Act did not apply because of the learned
professions exemption. 2
The Anesthesiologists court initially reviewed the case law es-
tablishing that price fixing is illegal per se. 3 After determining that
it had jurisdiction, 4 the court considered the effect of the ASA's
RVG on the setting of prices. Judge Duffy phrased the issue as
"whether there was an agreement that the [RVGI would be used
in pricing anesthesia services so as to curtail competition or interfere
with the setting of prices by free market forces."8 The court noted
an absence of evidence that the RVG was more than a "suggested
methodology" for setting prices and concluded that the RVG was
therefore not price fixing. 6 The Anesthesiologists opinion, however,
did not present a convincing or consistent argument that the ASA's
RVG did not fix prices under Socony. Judge Duffy acknowledged
that: first, the RVG "did tend to affect price formation;"" second,
the purpose of the ASA in publishing the RVG was to assist in
developing local fee schedules;8 and last, the RVG was "intended
to and did play an important role in the negotiations with third
party payors."89 Given these facts, Anesthesiologists cannot logi-
cally rest upon the finding of the court that the ASA formulated its
RVG without the purpose and effect "of raising, depressing, fixing
or stabilizing the price of a commodity [or a service] in interstate
commerce .... 90
That Judge Duffy realized the inadequacy of the "no price fix-
ing" holding is suggested in his statement that:
[Blecause this is a case of first impression and because it cannot be denied
that the relative value guides, although not intended to fix prices, did tend to
affect price formation, I believe a more extended review is in order. Indeed, I
believe the only proper way to analyze this case is under the "Rule of Rea-
son. -11I
The Anesthesiologists court then held that the ASA's RVG was not
a restraint of trade under the Sherman Act because it felt that the
in which the Court noted that a "purely advisory fee schedule" might present a "different
question."
82. See 473 F. Supp. at 158-60.
83. Id. at 155-56.
84. Id. at 156-57.
85. Id. at 158.
86. Id. at 158-59.
87. Id. at 159.
88. Id. at 158-59.
89. Id. at 155.
90. Id. at 159, quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223
(1940).
91. Id. (emphasis added).
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RVG was a reasonable means of establishing what anesthesiologists
should charge for their services. 2 The court justified the application
of a rule of reason with the language of Board of Trade, in which
the Supreme Court considered the reasonableness of a form of price
fixing instead of employing a per se approach. 3 By relying on this
shaky precedent, Judge Duffy avoided Socony and instead consid-
ered the reasonableness of a practice which, under Socony, was
illegal per se . 5 Under this reasonableness test, the court concluded
that the ASA's RVG promoted competition in the health care serv-
ices market because it enabled anesthesiologists to more easily ne-
gotiate with third party payors18 The Anesthesiologists opinion fails
to explain how competition was heightened by the combination of
providers of anesthesia services to better negotiate with the entities
paying the providers' fees.
IV. THE USE OF RVGs BY THE MEDICAL PROFESSION
United States v. American Society of Anesthesiologists reflects
both the failure of the court to understand the proper role of RVGs
in the fight against rising health care costs and the apparent inabil-
ity of the Supreme Court to articulate clearly the parameters of the
per se rule and the Rule of Reason. The district court relied upon
Board of Trade, a case of questionable precedential value,97 to jus-
tify determining under a reasonableness standard whether the
ASA's RVG was price fixing and, therefore, illegal per se. Reasona-
bleness, however, should not play a part in deciding whether a chal-
lenged activity is price fixing.
The courts should resolve the question whether a RVG is price
fixing with simple factual evaluation. As the Goldfarb Court stated,
the first step of the court's inquiry in a case in which price fixing is
alleged is, did the defendants "engage in price fixing?" 8 Socony
defined price fixing as those practices which raise, fix, peg, or stabi-
lize prices. 9 The issue, therefore, was whether the ASA's RVG
92. Judge Duffy stated:
In my view [the RVG's] widespread use was and is more a testament to a need on the
part of anesthesiologists for a cohesive, internally consistent, logical and appropriate
method for arriving at their fees than it is evidence of an attempt by the ASA to compel
(or even urge) adherence to any pricing formula.
Id. at 158.
93. Id. at 159.
94. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
95. See 473 F. Supp. at 159.
96. Id. at 159-60.
97. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 700 (1978).
98. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 780 (1975).
99. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
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raised, fixed, pegged, or stabilized the prices of anesthesiologists'
services.
As noted by the Anesthesiologists court, the purpose of the
ASA's RVG was to assist in developing local fee schedules.00 Fee
schedules were needed, or at least desired, because of the growing
role of third party payors in providing reimbursement to anesthe-
siologists for their services to consumers. 10' RVGs were developed
during the 1950s in response to the increased need of health insur-
ance plans for a uniform, consistent methodology to compute the
proper level of reimbursement for a physician performing a service
for an insured. °2 Physicians thus maintained their control over pric-
ing despite the position of the third party payors by negotiating as
a unit for the adoption of their self-formulated RVGs. °3 Given the
political and market power of physicians' groups, insurers were un-
derstandably reluctant to risk antagonizing them by rejecting a
RVG or suggested conversion factors."'
Common sense suggests that RVGs encourage price uniformity
and fixing. Although there are no empirical studies on the effects of
RVGs on price uniformity, commentators believe that RVGs pro-
mote such uniformity.0 5 Furthermore, physicians and their associa-
tions can and have used RVGs to increase the general level of fees
paid by third party payors by having the payors accept a revised
guide that facilitated fee escalation."'5 It is interesting to note that
almost every RVG published includes a disclaimer of price fixing
intent;07 the publishers obviously are aware of the price fixing possi-
bilities. Certainly, RVGs render price fixing very easy to accom-
plish."'8 One objection of the American Medical Association to a
100. 473 F. Supp. at 158.
101. See Brewster & Seldowitz, supra note 7, at 501; Sloan & Feldman, Competition
Among Physicians in FTC Conference, supra note 5, at 91. Sloan & Feldman note that in
1970 anesthesiologists received seventy-five percent of their gross revenues from third party
payors. Id.
102. Hearings on Reform Act, supra note 78, at 288 (Statement of Mr. Miller, Equitable
Life Assurance Society).
103. See generally Hearings on Skyrocketing Costs, supra note 1, at 230 (Statement of
Mr. Weller, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, State of Ohio); Sloan & Feldman, supra
note 101, at 90.
104. See generally Hearings on Skyrocketing Costs, supra note 1, at 230-303 (Testimony
and written statement of Mr. Weller).
105. See, e.g., Kallstrom, supra note 3, at 693. See also Sloan & Feldman, supra note
101, at 90-91; Blaine, supra note 7, at 1011.
106. See, e.g., Sobaski, Effects of the 1969 California Relative Value Studies on Costs
of Physician Services Under SMI (June 1975), cited in Sloan & Feldman, supra note 101, at
92.
107. Brewster & Seldowitz, supra note 7, at 506.
108. See Kanwit, Panel Discussion: Trade and Professional Associations: The Antitrust
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proposal that the federal government develop its own RVG for use
in the Medicare, Medicaid, and Champus °' programs is that once
the RVG were established, nothing could stop the government from
using the RVG as a set fee schedule." 0 Moreover, if the use of a RVG
itself is not adequate proof of price fixing, the minimal steps neces-
sary to use the RVG to establish fixed dollar amounts will be very
difficult to detect and nearly impossible-to prove."' United Liquors,
which invalidated an agreement fixing discount rates although no
dollar amounts were set, provides precedential support for the prop-
osition that under the Socony doctrine RVGs are price fixing and
illegal per se under the Sherman Act.
112
The Anesthesiologists court appeared to recognize that the
ASA's RVG was price fixing in the ordinary sense, as well as the
Socony meaning, of the words. The court, however, applied a rule
of reason in analyzing the legality of the RVG. One possible basis
for the use of a rule of reason was that the ASA was a combination
of professionals." 3 The Goldfarb and Professional Engineers deci-
sions indicated, however, that the per se rules for price fixing were
applicable to the professions."' The majority of courts since
Goldfarb and Professional Engineers have refused to exempt profes-
sionals from the scope of the Sherman Act."' Given the conflict of
interest physicians face in developing RVGs for use in negotiating
with insurers for their reimbursement levels and the similarity of
RVGs to the minimum fee schedule prohibited in Goldfarb, RVGs
are a particularly inappropriate exception to the Supreme Court's
statement that professions are subject to the command of the Sher-
man Act."'
Combat Zones, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. (ABA) 670, 671 (1977) (Ms. Kanwit was the Director,
Chicago Regional Office, FTC); Palmer, Antitrust Activities by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion in the Health Field-An Address Before a Joint Meeting of the Health & Welfare Com-
mittee and the Council of Antitrust and Trade Regulation of the FBA, 37 FED. BAR. J. 40, 46
(1978) (Mr. Palmer currently is on sabbatical from his position as Deputy Director, Bureau
of Competition, FTC).
109. The Champus program was established in 1956 and is the program providing
payment for medical services to military personnel and their dependents. 473 F. Supp. at 152.
110. See Hearings on Reform Act, supra note 78, at 248 (Statement of Drs. Holden &
Beddingfield, American Medical Association). But see id. at 393, 509 (Statements of Dr.
Ament, ASA, and the California Medical Association, respectively).
111. See Kallstrom, supra note 3, at 693-94.
112. See text accompanying note 52 supra. See also Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers
Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118,136 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4600, at 7011 (1971).
113. See text accompanying notes 66-77 supra.
114. See text accompanying notes 71, 75-77 supra.
115. Borsody, supra note 4, at 431.
116. See Comment, The Professions and Noncommercial Purposes: Applicability of Per
Se Rules Under the Sherman Act, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 387, 389, 413 (1978). See also Arizona
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Congress, of course, has the option of limiting the coverage of
the antitrust laws over physicians' participation in the development
of RVGs. In the last three sessions of Congress, Senator Talmadge
has introduced the Medicare-Medicaid Administrative and Reim-
bursement Reform Act, which allows the federal government to for-
mulate a RVG with the input of third party payors, physicians, and
associations of physicians." 7 Physicians' groups generally support
the RVG provision, but insist that physician input is essential to the
formulation of the RVG and worry that the government will take the
next step and construct a rigid fee schedule."' The FTC wants the
bill amended to exclude physicians from any participation in the
development.of the RVG."9 The bill has not passed, but Congres-
sional action is the proper way to legalize physician participation in
the development and dissemination of RVGs, if such involvement
is desirable.
The advantages of RVGs to the public at large relate to the
ability of third party payors to use RVGs in establishing appropriate
fee schedules for the reimbursement of individual physicians.'
20
Third party payors either reimburse physicians on a usual, custom-
ary, and reasonable (UCR) method or on a fee schedule method. 2'
Both methods use RVGs, but the fee schedule method is more de-
pendent on a set price structure and thus tends to rely more heavily
on the RVG's values. 2 2 Most commentators are convinced that the
UCR method is inherently inflationary because of its reliance on
usual and customary charges of physicians.1 'For that reason, the
government has encouraged third party payors, including the gov-
ernment itself, to develop fee schedule methods of reimbursement.
124
The FTC, however, does not want physicians involved in the devel-
State Dental Ass'n v. Boddicker, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977);
Borsody, supra note 4, at 455.
117. S. 505, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1864-76 (1979); S. 1470, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977); S. 3205, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
118. See note 110 supra.
119. See Hearings on Reform Act, supra note 78, at 449-52 (Letter of Mr. Pertschuk,
Chairman, FTC, expressing official views of FTC).
120. See Kallstrom, supra note 3, at 646-47, 660, 690-91.
121. For a brief explanation of the UCR (usual, customary, and reasonable) and CPR
(customary, prevailing, and reasonable) methods, see Hearings on Skyrocketing Costs, supra
note 1, at 706-09.
122. See generally Health Care Financing Administration Strategy Memo, 1980-81
(1979), reprinted in Hearings on Skyrocketing Costs, supra note 1, at 760-72.
123. Hearings on Skyrocketing Costs, supra note 1, at 854, 709 (Statements of Rep.
Moss and Mr. Derzon, Administrator of HCFA, respectively).
124. See, e.g., Health Care Financing Administration Strategy Memo, 1980-81, supra
note 122, at 6. See also Iglehart, A New Strategy for Medicare and Medicaid, 1978 NAT'L J.
471; note 119 supra.
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opment of the RVGs upon which the fee schedules will be based
because it feels that physician involvement will simply perpetuate
the inflationary spiral of health care costs present under the UCR
system. 125
Physician involvement in the development of RVGs cannot
benefit the consumer. Doctors have an inherent conflict of interest
between the desire to serve the public and the desire to compensate
themselves. 26 Third party payors have the experience and the abil-
ity to formulate their own RVGs.' 21 When third party payors develop
and use RVGs no conflict of interest arises because the insurers are
more directly concerned than even the consumer with the cost of
medical services.' 28 The consumer ultimately benefits from lower
premiums.
The FTC and Justice do not believe that the formulation and
use of RVGs by third party payors is a violation of the antitrust
laws.' 9 In their view, only competitors are prohibited from agreeing
on price indices; consumers and third party payors are free to estab-
lish RVGs, at least until such groups acquire the power to dictate
prices to the medical profession.' 0 The attitude of the FTC and
Justice is based on the perception that RVGs are: first, an essential
part of the health insurance industry and second, a valuable tool in
the fight against escalating medical costs because of their independ-
ence from the inflationary UCR methodology.'
3 '
V. CONCLUSION
RVGs have proven useful in the effort to slow the rise in the
costs of health care services. The Anesthesiologists decision repre-
sents a misguided attempt to reverse the actions of the FTC and
Justice in prohibiting medical societies and associations from pro-
mulgating RVGs. The court erred in two respects: first, the ASA's
RVG is a form of price fixing illegal per se under the Sherman Act
and the court's twisted evasion of that conclusion only hinders the
development of coherent doctrine in this area, and second, the bene-
125. See note 119 supra.
126. See Hearings on Reform Act, supra note 78, at 450-52. See also Havighurst,
supra note 5, at 386, 391; Kanwit, supra note 108, at 670-71.
127. See generally Sloan & Feldman, supra note 101.
128. Insurers pay almost two thirds of personal health care expenditures in the United
States. See CRS, HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES AND THEIR CONTROL 22 (1977), reprinted in
Hearings on Reform Act, supra note 78, at 588-638. Consumers rarely have an incentive or
interest in seeking out the cheapest health care available. See CRS, supra, at 24.
129. See note 119 supra.
130. See id. See also Kanwit, supra note 108, at 670-71.
131. See notes 108 & 119 supra. See also Kallstrom, supra note 3, at 689-96.
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fits to be gained from the use of RVGs by medical professionals are
obtained, without the detriments, by allowing third party payors to
promulgate RVGs. Allowing physician involvement in the develop-
ment of RVGs is simply not, competitively speaking, reasonable.
Physicians are competitors and it is rare when the consumer is not
benefited from competition in the market-RVGs are no exception.
DAVID R. SIMONSEN, JR.

